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Systems of Predication.
Aristotle’s Categories in Topics, I, 9*
1. IntroductIon
In Topics, I, 4-5 Aristotle introduces and describes the so-called ‘four predicables’ : 
definition (oJrismov~), property (i[dion), genus (gevno~) and accident (sumbebhkov~)1. These 
notions single out the four basic ways in which a predicate can belong to a certain 
subject. As forms of predicative relations between terms, the predicables are not types 
of predicate as rather types of predication. They are relational items : no predicate is 
a priori or simpliciter a property or an accident, but only with reference to a certain 
subject2. For example, ‘biped’ is a property of a human being but an accident of 
a dog who lost two paws. Further, inasmuch as Aristotle demonstrates, through 
induction (dia; th̀~ ejpagwgh̀~) and deduction (dia; sullogismoù), the completeness of the 
classification of the predicables in Topics, I, 8 (103b6-19), they constitute a ‘system’, 
i.e. a unitary, complete and organized set3. As a result, the four predicables form a 
* I am grateful to James Allen for valuable suggestions. I have benefited from discussing with him 
about almost every issue tackled in this work. My thanks also to Riccardo Chiaradonna, Giulio Di 
Basilio, Paolo Fait, Francesco Fronterotta, Lloyd Gerson and an anonymous reader for detailed written 
comments and constructive criticisms on an earlier version of this paper. I alone am responsible for 
any flaws in this work. — The Greek text of the Topics is quoted according to the critical edition of 
J. BrunschwIg, Aristote. Topiques. Tome I, Livres I-IV, texte établi et traduit, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 
1967. Unless otherwise said, translations are my own. 
 1 Aristotle does not have a common name for these four notions. He frequently uses either the 
word ‘genera’ (gevnh) or phrases with no substantive, cf. BrunschwIg, Aristote. Topiques cit., p. xlv n.1. 
There are clues to speculate that he could have used kathgorivai or kathgorouvmena, cf. infra, pp. 5 and 
10. ‘Predicables’ is a calque of the Latin word praedicabilia introduced in the Middle Ages, perhaps 
to distinguish these items from the ten ‘categories’ (praedicamenta). 
2 Cf. J. Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003, p. 65 ; M. MalInk, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (MA) 2013, p. 119.
3 Cf. BrunschwIg, Aristote. Topiques cit., pp. xlvII-vIII ; Id., Sur le système des ‘prédicables’ dans 
les Topiques d’Aristote, in Energeia. Études Aristotéliciennes offertes à Mgr. Antonio Jannone, Vrin, 
Paris 1986, pp. 145-157 ; Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction cit., pp. 303-306 ; MalInk, Aristotle’s Modal 
Syllogistic cit., pp. 115-117. More precisely, Aristotle proves that every proposition (provtasi~) or problem 
(provblhma) expresses one of the predicative relations conveyed by the four predicables (a claim stated 
and left unproved at 101b17-25). However, despite Aristotle’s demonstration in I, 8 and his mention of 
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roberto granieri2
system of predication. The theoretical issue tackled by Aristotle through this system 
is a relevant one and might be expressed by this question : which are all the possible 
types of predication one can make of an object ? His answer, in this context, is the 
following : when a predicate P is (truly) predicated of a subject S, then P must be 
either a definition, or a genus, or a property or an accident of S. 
In Topics, I, 9, according to the interpretation I attempt to support, Aristotle 
introduces another system of predication, consisting of ten items. He distinguishes 
this system from the predicables and explores their mutual relationship. These two 
systems, I maintain, cut across each other and their relationship is semantic in 
nature (§2). Further, this second list of kinds of predications (gevnh tw`n kathgoriw`n) 
introduced in I, 9 is nearly identical with the list of items signified by the ‘things 
said without any combination’ (ta ; kata; mhdemivan sumplokh;n legovmena) presented 
in Chapter 4 of the Categories4. It is widely agreed that these are the two most 
complete lists of ‘categories’ in the Corpus Aristotelicum. The only difference 
between them is their first member, which in the Topics is called ‘what it is’ (tiv 
ejsti), while in the Categories is ‘substance’ (oujsiva). Commentators have often 
identified these two lists and their first members. I argue, on the contrary, that 
the lists of Topics, I, 9 (henceforth T-categories) and Categories, 4 (C-categories)5 
cannot be considered identical and that Aristotle not only separate them but also 
explains their connection (§3). 
2. two systeMs of predIcatIon : a seMantIc InterpretatIon
In the opening sentence of I, 9, Aristotle introduces ten gevnh tw`n kathgoriw`n 
and connects them to the four predicables. Next, he lists these gevnh and makes 
clear the nature of this connection. 
« Now, after these things, we have to determine the kinds of predications in which 
the four aforementioned <predications> are found. They are ten in number : what 
‘four items’ throughout Book I (cf. e.g. 4, 101b16-25), the number of the predicables distinguished by 
Aristotle is not an uncontroversial question. As Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction cit., pp. 30-31 remarks, 
there are reasons to maintain that Aristotle intended his fourfold scheme as a provisional one and 
there are passages suggesting a possible extension thereof, e.g. separating difference from genus (cf. 
IV, 6, 128a20-29). This might also explain why Aristotle’s followers, from Theophrastus to Porphyry, 
did not hesitate to reduce or increase the number of the predicables. Nonetheless, even though I do 
not take the word ‘system’ in too strong a sense and not exclude possible variations in Aristotle’s view, 
I think that, as far as Book I is concerned, there is little doubt that Aristotle has in mind a classification 
of exactly four predicative relations. More in detail, he explicitly includes difference under genus (cf. 
4, 101b17-19). Cf. also M. MalInk, Categories in Topics I.9, « Rhizai », 4, 2007, pp. 271-294 : p. 281. 
4 Cf. Cat., 4, 1b25-2a4 (trans. Ackrill).
5 I take from MalInk, Categories cit. the denominations T-categories and C-categories. 
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systems of predications 3
it is, of a certain quantity, of a certain quality, relative to something, somewhere, 
at some time, lying, having, acting, being affected. For the accident, the genus, 
the property and the definition are always in one of these predications. For all 
the propositions <formed> by means of them [viz. accident, genus, property and 
definition] signify either what it is, or of a certain quantity, of a certain quality or 
one of the other predications »6. 
In what follows I first address the meaning of gevnh tw`n kathgoriw`n and try 
to justify why I take the list at 103b22-23 as a second ‘system of predication’. 
Then, I argue for a semantic interpretation of the relationship between the four 
predicables and these ten kinds of predication.
Some interpreters have claimed that a kathgoriva is either a ‘predicate’ or a 
‘predication’7. In I, 9 there are five occurrences of this term (103b20-21, 25, 26-27, 
29, 38-39)8. Following Frede, I maintain that the most appropriate translation 
is ‘predication’ throughout the chapter, with the single exception of b29, where 
‘predicate’ must be preferred9. I shall account for this exception below. Three 
chief reasons support the choice for ‘predication’ in all the other cases.
 (1) The other six occurrences of this term in the Topics (107a3 ; 109b5 ; 141a4 ; 
152a38 ; 178a5 ; 181b27) very likely have this meaning and at least three of them 
(109b5 ; 141a4 ; 181b27) must do so. 
 (2) In b21 we read the phrase aiJ rJhqeìsai tevttare~ (‘the four aforementioned’). As 
Alexander of Aphrodisias already observed, this phrase is of course elliptical (‘the 
6 103b20-27 : meta; toivnun tau`ta dei` oJrivsasqai ta; gevnh tw`n kathgoriw`n ejn oi|~ uJpavrcousin aiJ rJhqei`sai 
tevttare~. e[sti de; tau`ta to;n ajriqmo;n devka, tiv ejsti, posovn, poiovn, prov~ ti, pou`, potev, kei`sqai, e[cein, poiei`n, 
pavscein. ajei; ga;r to; sumbebhko;~ kai; to; gevno~ kai; to; i[dion kai; oJ oJrismov~ ejn mia`/ touvtwn tw`n kathgoriw`n e[stai: 
pa`sai ga;r aiJ dia; touvtwn protavsei~ h] tiv ejsti h] posovn h] poiovn h] tw`n a[llwn tina; kathgoriw`n shmaivnousin.
7 Cf., e.g., S. MansIon, Notes sur la doctrine des catégories dans les Topiques, in g. e. l. owen ed., 
Aristotle on Dialectic, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1968, p. 191 and T. eBert, Gattungen der Prädikate und 
Gattungen des Seienden bei Aristoteles : Zum Verhältnis von Cat. 4 und Top. I 9, « Archiv für Geschichte 
der Philosophie », 67, 1985, pp. 114-123 for ‘predicate’ ; M. frede, Categories in Aristotle, in Id., Essays 
in Ancient Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1987, pp. 29-48 : pp. 32-36 and 
J. Barnes, Aristotle’s Categories and Aristotle’s ‘categories’, in Id., Logical Matters. Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy II, ed. by M. BonellI, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2011, pp. 187-265  : p. 190, for ‘predication’.
8 Only in the first occurrence kathgoriva is preceded by ta; gevnh. Otherwise Aristotle simply uses tẁn 
kathgoriẁn and dismisses the previous phrase, apparently referring to the same objects. Thus, ta; gevnh tẁn 
kathgoriẁn is equivalent to the simple kathgorivai. According to R. sMIth, Aristotle : Topics. Books I-VIII 
with excerpts from related texts, Translated with a Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, p. 74, 
similar equivalences occur also in APr. for ‘problems’ and ‘kinds of problems’, ‘causes’ and ‘kinds of causes’. 
9 Cf. frede, Categories cit., pp. 33-35. My work is much indebted to Frede’s groundbreaking paper. 
However, in what follows I shall criticize some crucial points in his reading. 
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roberto granieri4
four aforementioned [something]’)10. Intuitively one would tend to say that Aristotle 
is referring to the four predicables described in I, 4-6 and whose exhaustivity is 
demonstrated in I, 8. This hypothesis is confirmed by the next sentence (b23-25), where 
sumbebhkov~, gevno~, i[dion and oJrismov~ are explicitly recalled, and they unambiguously 
are ‘the four aforementioned’11. According to the grammar, though, the implicit noun 
should be kathgorivai12. It means that the same word designates both the predicables 
and the ten categories introduced by Aristotle in the opening sentence and listed in 
the next one. However, as I already remarked, the predicables are not ‘predicates’, 
but ‘predications’. This further proves that gevnh tw`n kathgoriw`n should mean ‘kinds 
of predications’.
 (3) At b22-23 Aristotle lists the ‘kinds of predications’13. Most commentators, 
since Alexander, have considered this list identical with another ten-items list which 
Aristotle provides in Cat., 4, 1b25-2a4. These two lists consist exactly of the same 
members except for the first one : in the Topics the first member is ‘what it is’ (tiv 
ejsti), while in the Categories it is ‘substance’ (oujsiva). It has been usually assumed 
that these two phrases are synonyms14. However, leaving a closer examination of 
this assumption to §3, I now confine myself to claiming that the textual evidence 
of I, 9 does not warrant this identification. Indeed, as some recent studies have 
shown15, it rather suggests that tiv ejsti and oujsiva cannot be identical items. More 
generally, the tiv ejsti must be taken as a predication. A predicate P is a ‘what it is’ 
10 Cf. alex. aphr., In Top., 65, 13. I assume that the diaforaiv found after tevttare~ in some more 
recent mss. and in Boethius’ translation, is a posterior interpolation. Alexander does not have this 
word in his text, and it is absent from the older mss., cf. G. collI, Aristotele. Organon, Einaudi, Torino 
1955, p. 919. Alexander, though, in order to explain the phrase, claims that Aristotle has omitted 
diaforai; tw`n problhmavtwn te kai; protavsew~ (In Top., 65, 13-14). Hence, it is very likely that diaforaiv 
had been later introduced in the main text on the basis of Alexander’s gloss. 
11 The ga;r at b23 is epexegetical. Both the subject and the object of both the predicates are exactly the 
same, i.e. the four predicables and the ten T-categories. So the two verbs point out the same kind of relation.
12 Considering the terminological context of Topics, I, the implicit noun can be either provtasi~ or 
kathgoriva. About the former, at b26, i.e. five lines after our phrase, this is the subject of a sentence 
which has a similar meaning with respect to the first one we are dealing with. However, the last 
occurrence of provtasi~, to whom the pronoun is supposed to refer, is at 103b4, i.e. 17 lines before. 
So, presumably, the implicit noun is not provtasi~ but kathgoriva, mentioned in the same sentence few 
words before, though in a different case.
13 The plural neutral adjective tau`ta at b22 must refer to the previous ta; gevnh.
14 Cf. e.g. alex. aphr., In Top., 65, 14-19 ; collI, Aristotele. Organon cit., p. 921 ; J. L. ackrIll, 
Aristotle : Categories and De Interpretatione, Translated with Notes, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963, p. 
79 ; MansIon, Notes sur la doctrine cit., p. 198 ; C. kahn, Questions and Categories, in H. hIz ed., Questions, 
Reidel, Dordrecht 1978, pp. 227-278 : p. 237 ; sMIth, Aristotle. Topics cit., p. 75.
15 Cf. e.g. J. MalcolM, On the Generation and Corruption of the Categories, « Review of Metaphysics », 
33, 1981, pp. 662-681 : pp. 664f. ; frede, Categories cit., pp. 36-37 ; MalInk , Categories cit., p. 273 ; 
Barnes, Aristotle’s Categories cit., pp. 196-198.
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systems of predications 5
when it expresses an essential attribute of a subject S, i.e. when it appropriately 
answers the question ‘what is S ?’. As a result, a predicate P is not a priori a ‘what 
it is’, but rather with respect to a certain subject S. 
These last remarks suggest the following conclusion. The word kathgoriva can 
certainly mean both ‘predicate’ and ‘predication’, but in Topics, I, 9 the latter 
should be preferred (in seven of its eight occurrences)16. Hence, in this chapter, 
another list of kinds of predication is introduced. Aristotle never explicitly comes 
up with a demonstration of its members, neither inductive nor deductive, like for 
the predicables in I, 8. Nonetheless, in I, 9, he presents these kinds saying that 
they are exactly ten in number (e[sti de; tau`ta to;n ajriqmo;n devka), i.e. suggesting that 
he is providing a complete and exhaustive set17. So I call also this second list a 
‘system of predication’. 
16 Pace MalInk, Categories cit., p. 271 who is persuaded that the two translations do not need to 
be mutually exclusive. In this article, though, he does not explicitly provide any reasons to justify his 
opinion. The only pertinent argument I found is in MalInk, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic cit., p. 145 n. 
20. Quoting Alexander, In Top., 66, 7-10, Malink states that « a term belongs to a given T-category 
just in case every predication in which this term occurs as the predicate belongs to that T-category ». 
However, I still do not see Malink’s point. This reading seems to me still open to an objection already 
advanced by Frede, i.e. that a predication like ‘white is a colour’ is in the first category of predication 
(tiv ejsti), but ‘color’ as a predicate could not be in any other kind of predicate than poiovn.
17 The demonstration of the completeness and systematicity of the table of categories is a vexed 
question of Aristotelian scholarship. Aristotle does not give any strong proves of the exhaustiveness of 
his table, nor he declares whether he followed a criterion whatsoever to fill that out. I confine myself 
to speculating that the list descends from an inductive recollection and an accurate classification 
of all the things that can be asked or said about a given subject (cf. e.g. SE, 22, 178a4f.), likely 
fostered by a prolonged practice in dialectical discussions and definitory divisions within Plato’s 
Academy, where Aristotle was educated. Otherwise said, the categories were selected one by one 
and catalogued on the basis of empirical observations ; for similar readings cf. C. M. gIllespIe, The 
Aristotelian Categories, « Classical Quarterly », 19, 1925, pp. 75-84 ; E. kapp, Greek Foundations of 
Traditional Logic, Columbia University Press, New York 1942 ; ackrIll, Aristotle. Categories cit. ; kahn, 
Questions cit. ; frede, Categories cit. ; S. Menn, Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories, « Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale », 100, 1995, pp. 311-377 ; R. Bodéüs, Aristote. [Categories], introduction, 
texte, traduction et notes, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001. Notice that (1) Aristotle refers to exact 
numbers even of other kinds of things, e.g. four causes or twelve virtues. In all these cases Aristotle 
does not give a strict justification of the number at issue, which is presumably established by means 
of induction, cf. C. natalI, Aristotele, Categorie, 4. La lista delle categorie, in M. BonellI, f. MasI eds., 
Studi sulle Categorie di Aristotele, Hakkert, Amsterdam 2011, pp. 89-94 : p. 90. Further, (2) in An. Pr., 
B, 23, 68b13-4 Aristotle claims that every pivsti~ is reached either by syllogism or by induction (a{panta 
ga;r pisteuvomen h] dia; sullogismou` h] ejx ejpagwgh`~). The completeness of the table of categories is never 
demonstrated by syllogism, so it is likely reached by induction. As a matter of fact, (3) induction is 
one of the two proves to demonstrate the completeness of the list of the predicables in Top., I, 8. So 
Aristotle regards induction at least as a proof worth to be mentioned. Moreover, besides Top., I, 9 
and Cat., 4 Aristotle either composes shorter lists or avoids recalling all the items of the list, making 
use of abbreviations (cf. K. oehler, Aristoteles. Kategorien, Übersetzt und Erläutert, Academie Verlag, 
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The aforementioned theoretical issue — which are all the possible types of 
predication one can make in relation to an object ? — seems to be given a second 
answer : when a predicate P is (truly) predicated of a subject S, then P is either 
a ‘what it is’, or a ‘quantity’ or a ‘quality’ and so on. 
So far, then, there are two actors in this scenario, two systems of predication, 
both designated by the label of kathgorivai : 
(a) Predicables : sumbebhkov~, gevno~, i[dion, oJrismov~.
(b) T-categories : tiv ejsti, posovn, poiovn etc. 
Next task is to determine the nature of their relationship. 
Aristotle expresses the relationship between T-categories and predicables by 
means of the phrase ejn oi|~ uJpavrcousin, which I translated ‘are found in’18. I assume 
that here the verb uJpavrcein is used in a non-technical fashion, i.e. does not mean 
anything like ‘being predicated of’ (as synonym of kathgorei`sqai katav tino~), nor 
does it denote the belonging of a quality or an attribute to a given substrate (as 
synonym of to; uJpokeivmenon paqeìn)19. At b24-25, in fact, an equivalence is established 
between (e[n tini) uJpavrcein and a ‘generic’ (e[n tini) ei\nai , ‘being in (something)’20. 
So uJpavrcein is rather employed in its ordinary meaning of ‘belonging to’, ‘being 
found in’ or ‘being present in’21. Taking this for granted, we still need to know what 
is the philosophical sense of ‘being found’ here. Commentators do not usually 
provide satisfactory explanations about this point. How is a predicable found in 
one of the kinds of predications ? 
When we predicate a genus or a definition of a given subject, both designate, 
at different levels of generality, what a subject is, an essential attribute of a 
subject. So these are instances of tiv ejsti. By contrast, when we predicate one 
of the other two predicables, i.e. a property or an accident, these are instances 
of posovn, poiovn, prov~ ti and so on, as long as both coincide with a non-essential 
attribute of a subject. This seems very likely to be how the predicables belong to 
or are found in the T-categories. 
Berlin, 1984, pp. 289-292 for a complete comparative table of all the enumerations of categories in 
the Corpus Aristotelicum). How can one account for this numeric discrepancy ? Top., I, 9 and Cat., 4 
offer the most extended pattern of all the possible categories, albeit it should not mean that in every 
single case, the entire scheme is useful to the current inquiry. For example, the seventh and eighth 
categories (kei`sqai, e[cein) are useful if one takes a human being as object of questioning, while do 
not make sense if applied to other objects. 
18 Cf. e.g. sMIth, Aristotle. Topics cit., p. 8, MalcolM, On the Generation cit., p. 663 and Barnes, 
Aristotle’s Categories cit., p. 189 for this translation.
19 Cf. H. BonItz, Index Aristotelicus, Reimer, Berlin 1870, p. 789a for these technical acceptations.
20 Cf. supra p. 4 n. 11.
21 Cf. LSJ s.v. uJpavrcein. 
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systems of predications 7
But what is the nature of this belonging or presence ? The term gevnh would 
suggest membership in a kind, i.e. the belonging of a species to a genus. But a 
species falling under a genus cannot fall under other genera which are not in the 
same column of predicates. For example, ‘man’ is under ‘animal’, but cannot be 
also under ‘color’ unless accidentally. On the other hand, property and accident 
do so, since they would be species of posovn, poiovn and so forth. Consequently, 
this is not the right type of relationship we are looking for. I do not think either, 
from a more general point of view, that any extensional interpretation of this 
relationship, or any interpretation explaining this belonging or presence as a 
subordination, can aspire to fit well these lines. 
I propose the adoption of a semantic interpretation of this belonging. According 
to this option, a predicable is found in a category as a constituent. It means that 
every proposition formed through a predicable constitutes at the same time a 
predication according to one of the ten T-categories, and, consequently, signifies 
one of them, expressing one of the predicative relationships conveyed by them. 
This hypothesis is confirmed at b25-622, where it is specified that the uJpavrcein/
ei\nai ejn-relationship consists in a relationship of signification linking every 
proposition built up by means of a predicable, to one of the T-categories. There 
does not exist, in other words, any proposition composed through one of the 
four predicables, which is not a proposition expressing one of the ten categories 
too. Further, this belonging is also biunivocal because as long as a proposition 
formed through a predicable signifies simultaneously one of the ten T-categories, 
the converse is likewise true, viz. every proposition built up through a T-category 
means at the same time one of the predicative relationship conveyed by one of the 
predicables. This ‘biunivocity’ is not explicit in our passage. Nonetheless, I think 
it is legitimate to infer it, for the simple reason that the opposite is false. We will 
not find any propositions expressing one of the ten predicative relationships of 
the T-categories, which does not express one of the four predicative relationships 
of the predicables too. After all, in Top., I, and particularly in Chapters 4-12, the 
focus is on the predicables not on the categories. If this is not groundless, we 
can infer the following conclusion : in Top., I, 8 is stated that every proposition 
or discourse (lovgoi) is formed through one of the predicables ; in I, 9 Aristotle 
establishes also that every proposition formed through one of the predicables 
signifies at the same time one of the ten kinds of another system of predication. 
Therefore, each proposition signifies one of the ten T-categories23. 
22 « For all the propositions <formed> by means of them [viz. accident, genus, property and 
definition] signify either what it is, or of what quantity, or of what sort or one of the other predications ». 
I interpret the gavr at b25 as epexegetical. 
23 Cf. MalInk, Categories cit. p. 275.
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Accordingly, we have two systems of predication cutting across each other, so 
that predications classified under the heads corresponding to the four predicables 
can also be classified under the heads specified in the list of the T-categories. 
That is presumably why Aristotle calls predicables and T-categories with the 
same term (kathgoriva), i.e. in order to remark this double track in predication. 
The clarification of this intersection seems to me the main purpose of Chapter 9. 
3. t-categorIes and c-categorIes
The list of ten kinds of predication occurring in Topics, I, 9, as I have already 
noted, counts almost the same members as that of ten items signified by the ‘things 
said without any combination’ in Categories, 424. The only variation in these two 
lists involves their first member. It has almost always proved tempting, at least 
since Alexander of Aphrodisias, to identify these lists, and take tiv ejsti and oujsiva 
as synonyms. These are the two most complete enumerations of the categories 
in the Corpus Aristotelicum. Thus, supposing that Aristotle had just one list of 
categories, it has been concluded that T-categories and C-categories correspond 
and represent Aristotle’s complete ‘table of categories’. Moreover, in the manifold 
classifications of categories we find throughout the Corpus Aristotelicum, there 
is a quite wide range of phrases or words aimed to designate the first of their 
items, viz. oujsiva, tiv, tovde, tovde ti. So it has seemed reasonable to suppose either 
that all these phrases are synonyms, or, even though they do not have precisely 
the same meaning, they should at least have the same denotatum, of which they 
specify different aspects. 
However, in Topics, I, 9 Aristotle states something significantly different. 
Reading the following passage in a non-biased way, it is hard to deny that ‘what 
it is’ and ‘substance’ cannot be the same :
« On the other hand, it is clear from the things themselves that someone who signifies 
the ‘what it is’, signifies either a substance, or a quantity or a quality, or one of the 
other predicates. For when a human is taken as an example and one says that the 
example is a man or an animal, one says what it is and signifies a substance. On the 
other hand, when a white color is taken as an example and one says that the example 
is white or a color, one says what it is and signifies of what sort. And likewise when a 
magnitude of a cubit is taken as an example and one says that the example is, one says 
what it is and signifies of what quantity. And likewise in the other cases »25.  
24 Cf. Cat., 4.1b25-2a4 (trans. Ackrill).
25 103b27-35 : dh`lon ejx aujtw`n o{ti to; tiv ejsti shmaivnwn oJte; me;n oujsivan shmaivnei, oJte; de; posovn, oJte; de; 
poiovn, oJte; de; tw`n a[llwn tina; kathgoriw`n. o{tan me;n ga;r ejkkeimevnou ajnqrwvpou fh`/ to; ejkkeivmenon a[nqrwpon 
ei\nai h] zw`/on, tiv ejsti levgei kai; oujsivan shmaivnei. o{tan de; crwvmato~ leukou` ejkkeimevnou fh`/ to; ejkkeivmenon 
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In what follows, I first argue for the distinction of the lists at b22-23 and b28-
29. Then I reply to two possible objections against a part of my reading. Finally I 
provide an overall account of the relationship between predicables, T-categories 
and C-categories.
As I already remarked, the governing claim (b27-29) of the passage just 
mentioned, which is illustrated by three examples (b29-35), suggests that tiv ejsti 
and oujsiva cannot be identical items. The tiv ejsti is not restricted to substances and 
includes instances of oujsiva, posovn, poiovn and so forth. Commentators endorsing 
the traditional interpretation cannot avoid to acknowledge that, as long as the 
identification of tiv ejsti and oujsiva is maintained, this identification can fit only 
two of the eight occurrences of tiv ejsti, i.e. the first two of b22 and 26, where tiv 
ejsti appears as the first item of the list of T-categories. Whereas in the other 
six occurrences it does not work. Otherwise said, one would have to argue that 
tiv ejsti is used equivocally, i.e. with different meanings, without any explicit 
clarifications by Aristotle. 
The majority of those interpreters are confident of solving this putative ambiguity 
through a reference to Metaph., Z, 4, 1030a17-3126. In this passage, Aristotle declares 
that ‘what it is’ is said in an primary and absolute sense (prwvto~ kai; aJplẁ~), of the 
substance, and in a secondary sense (pẁ~, ei\ta) of the other categories27. Thus, in 
b22 and 26, tiv ejsti is used in its specific acceptation of ‘substance’, while in the 
other six occurrences in a more generic sense of ‘essence’. Yet, since in Topics, I, 9 
there is no mention whatsoever of this piece of doctrine, these interpreters should 
assume that Aristotle, in this chapter, took for granted that readers or listeners 
were conscious of this implicit reference to a different tenet, i.e. that the ‘what it is’ 
par excellence is the substance. This also implies that the two lists given at b22-23 
(and 26-27) and 28-29 are one and the same list, namely the same presented in the 
Categories, though seen from different perspectives. Nonetheless, even if one wants 
to concede such a very unnatural reading of the text, this reference to Metaph., Z, 
4 is not legitimate, as Aristotle does not seem to have yet come up with that piece 
leuko;n ei\nai h] crẁma, tiv ejsti levgei kai; oujsivan shmaivnei. oJmoivw~ de; kai; eja;n phcuaivou megevqou~ ejkkeimevnou fh̀/ 
to; ejkkeivmenon phcuaìon ei\nai mevgeqo~, tiv ejsti levgei kai; poso;n shmaivnei. oJmoivw~ de; kai; ejpi; tẁn a[llwn. I take the 
phrase dh̀lon ejx aujtẁn as pointing to a transition to another argumentative segment : Aristotle’s focus 
is no more on the relationship between T-categories and predicables, but between T-categories and 
C-categories. So I give the dev a slightly adversative value (‘on the other hand’). 
26 Cf. e.g. alex. aphr., In Top., p. 65, 17-19 ; F. A. trendelenBurg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, 
Verlag von G. Bethge, Berlin 1846, p. 47 n. 1 ; MansIon, Notes sur la doctrine cit., p. 198 ; kahn, 
Questions cit., p. 243.
27 Cf. part. 1030a17-23 : « […] ‘what a thing is’ in one sense means substance and a ‘this’, in another 
one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as ‘is’ is predicable of all things, not 
however in the same sense, but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way, so too 
the ‘what’ belongs simply to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories » (transl. Ross).
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roberto granieri10
of doctrine whereby he distinguishes different senses of ‘what it is’. This is a tenet 
which, as I shall remark below, Aristotle comes up with at the time of the redaction 
of the central books of the Metaphysics, which are beyond doubt later than Topics, 
I. Consequently, this cannot be a piece of doctrine that a reader or a listener could 
have presupposed. So the ambiguous use of tiv ejsti in I, 9 remains unexplained by 
commentators endorsing the traditional interpretation of this passage and results 
in being significantly puzzling for any reader. 
There is an alternative way of interpreting the account of I, 9. This can make 
a perfect sense, though not the traditional one, even assuming that tiv ejsti is 
employed in its usual (originally Platonic) meaning (‘what it is’), in all of the eight 
occurrences of I, 9 and throughout the treatise. So the occurrences at b22 and 26 
are not exceptions to this trend and between tiv ejsti and oujsiva there is not a mere 
difference in name. As a result, in I, 9 we have two different and irreducible lists 
of categories, one corresponding to the ten kinds of predication listed at b22-23, 
the T-categories, and another, whose first item is oujsiva, placed under the first 
T-category, the tiv ejsti. As I said, I identify this second list with that of Categories, 
428, so I call its members C-categories.
So we have now three actors in our scenario, all designated by the word 
kathgorivai :
(a) Predicables : sumbebhkov~, gevno~, i[dion, oJrismov~.
(b) T-categories : tiv ejsti, posovn, poiovn, prov~ ti etc.
(c) C-categories : oujsiva, posovn, poiovn, prov~ ti etc.
Thus, every non-traditional interpretation is compelled to admit that kathgorivai 
is used ambiguously here, and has three denotata29. C-categories, though, cannot be 
‘predications’, like the four predicables and the ten T-categories, because their first 
member is oujsiva which is not a predication. The classification in Cat., 4 is expressly 
presented as a classification of items signified by ta; kata; mhdemivan sumplokh;n 
legovmena. To be sure, this is presumably meant to imply a parallel classification 
of the ‘things said without combination’ themselves. Otherwise said, linguistic 
expressions and their referents (denotata) are corresponding fields30. I take this 
28 This is also maintained, albeit without any argument, by MalcolM, On the Generation cit., p. 665 
and MalInk, Categories cit., p. 271.
29 Some interpreters, such as J. P. anton, On the Meaning of Kategoria in Aristotle‘s Categories, in 
A. preus, J. P. anton eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy V, SUNY Press, Albany 1992, pp. 1-18 : 
p. 6 claim that kathgoriva might be actually considered as a pollacw`~ legovmenon, although there is no 
explicit textual ground to endorse plainly this conclusion. 
30 Cf. D. sedley, Aristotelian Relativities, in M. canto-sperBer, P. pellegrIn eds., Le Style de la Pensée, 
Paris, Les Belles Lettres 2002, pp. 324-352 : p. 333, who talks about predicates having both linguistic 
and metaphysical value. However, Sedley seems to assume that Cat., 4 primarily and directly lists 
legovmena and not items signified by legovmena, which is a claim I’m not inclined to endorse. I thank the 
anonymous reader for saving me from a gross mistake at this point.
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systems of predications 11
parallel list of linguistic expressions as a list of predicates, and I claim that this is 
recalled in Top., I, 9, 103b28-29. Hence in Topics, I, 9 Aristotle presents two lists of 
predications and a list of predicates, clarifies that they should be kept separated, 
and explains their mutual connection. 
I shall now make another point, that is actually rather speculative. Unlike 
T-categories, that Aristotle introduces ex novo, as the first lines of our passage 
suggest31, C-categories look as a ‘ready-made’ list which Aristotle does not need 
to present as something new and assumes as known. Now, it has been argued 
that a careful comparison between the Categories and the Topics suggests that 
the former was written before the latter and provided its general preliminary 
conceptual basis32. In other words the Topics assumes as known several essential 
concepts of the Categories and build upon them. Examples thereof are the accounts 
of the opposites, of the homonymies and synonyms, of the difference. If this 
presupposition is conceded, one might raise the following hypothesis about the 
relationship between T-categories and C-categories. According to this hypothesis 
we have three steps.
(1) Aristotle sets forth the C-categories in the Categories.
(2) Next, when he comes to tackle the problem of the possible kinds of 
predication which can be made about an object, in the Topics, Aristotle exploits 
the pattern of notions put forward in the list of Cat., 4 to fill out another list of 
kinds of predications, the T-categories. When he sets forth this second list, in 
Top., I, 9, he explains its relationship both with another system of predication, 
the predicables, and with the C-categories which the T-categories derive from. 
In this sense, T-categories are an application of C-categories to the logical field 
of propositions33. So Aristotle runs two different lists that, according to some 
interpreters, are two parallel and independent devices exploited autonomously 
by Aristotle throughout his works, on the base of the type of object he examines34.
 (3) In the Metaphysics, as Frede has argued, these two lists overlap through a 
restriction of the first T-category, the ‘what it is’, to the first C-category, ‘substance’. 
This is one of the most considerable outcomes of a new piece of doctrine elaborated 
by Aristotle at the time of the redaction of the central books of the Metaphysics, 
that of the relationship pro;~ e{n : the truth of statements about non-substantial items 
grounds on truth about substances.
31 Cf., in particular, two textual clues : the verb ‘determine’ (oJrivsasqai) and the specification of the 
number of items. 
32 Cf. I. husIk, On the Categories of Aristotle, « The Philosophical Review », 13, 1904, pp. 514-528. 
However, Husik identifies T-categories and C-categories.
33 Cf. trendelenBurg, Geschichte cit., pp. 164-165. Cf. contra kahn, Questions cit., p. 242-243 for 
the claim that in the Topics we find the earliest version of the doctrine of categories. 
34 Cf. MalcolM, On the Generation cit., pp. 669-671.
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Before I move on to explain the connection between the three lists, I should 
address two objections raised by Frede against the possible identification of the 
list provided at 103b28-29 with that of Categories, 4, or rather, against the claim 
that in Aristotle’s logical works, as well as in all the other writings earlier than 
the central books of the Metaphysics, it actually occurs a list of ‘categories’ whose 
first member is oujsiva.
(a) According to Frede, in the Topics, as much as in the Organon in general, 
no category of ‘substance’ exists. A category of oujsiva appears only in Aristotle’s 
later writings, especially in the Metaphysics, as a restriction of the first T-category 
of tiv ejsti to substances. Frede takes this restriction, as I said, as one of the most 
considerable outcomes of the doctrine of the relationship pro;~ e[n35. In I, 9, therefore, 
oujsiva is not one of tw`n a[llwn kathgoriw`n mentioned right after (b28-29), but it 
refers just to a given object. It is posovn, poiovn and the other implicit items (with 
reference to b22-23) which are kinds of predicates, not oujsiva. It follows that, if 
one indicates the first T-category, she may indicate, on the one hand an oujsiva, 
which is not a kind of predicate ; on the other hand, one of the other kinds of 
predicates. Hence if oujsiva should not be conceived as a category, the enumeration 
of items at b28-29 is not effectively a list of ‘categories’ starting with ‘substance’. 
But if in the Topics there is no category of ‘substance’, and in Categories, 4 oujsiva is 
certainly one of the items signified by one ‘things said without any combination’, 
which are usually taken as the ‘Categories’ categories’, it means that the list of 
Topics, I, 9, 103b28-29 and that of Categories, 4 cannot overlap. 
To this objection I reply that in Top., IV, 1, 120b36-121a9 Aristotle explicitly 
mentions again oujsiva, posovn, poiovn, prov~ ti and, by a usual abbreviate form (oJmoivw~ 
de; kai; ejpi; tw`n a[llwn), all the other members of the list given at I, 9, 103b28-29, 
under the heading of ‘divisions’ (diairevsei~)36. The context of the passage strongly 
suggests that this label means kind of predicate (not predication), i.e. refers to 
tw`n a[llwn tina; kathgoriw`n of 103b29. For Aristotle says that a genus and a species 
should belong to the same ‘division’ (kaqovlou d∆ eijpein uJpo; th;n aujth;n diaivresin dei` to; 
gevno~ tw`/ ei[dei ei\nai), i.e. two predicates with different extension, one subordinated 
to another in the same column of predicates, should fall under the same kind of 
predicate. There is no doubt that oujsiva is actually one of these diairevsei~ and I 
do not see any good reason to interpret this passage separating oujsiva from the 
other ‘divisions’. This passage is never quoted or recalled by Frede. So in the 
Topics there is a passage in which the separation that he proposes does not work. 
35 Cf. frede, Categories cit., pp. 39-46.
36 « Moreover, see whether the genus and the species are not found in the same division, but the 
one is a substance while the other is a quality, or the one is a relative while the other is a quality (e[ti 
eij mh; ejn th`/ aujth`/ diairevsei to; gevno~ kai; to; ei\do~, ajlla; to; me;n oujsiva to; de; poiovn, h] to; me;n prov~ ti to; de; poiovn) » 
(transl. Pickard-Cambridge). 
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systems of predications 13
(b) The second objection is that we cannot rely on the Categories in order 
to find a satisfactory meaning of kathgoriva, or better, that the Categories is not 
about categories. Thus the list of items signified by the ‘things said without any 
combination’ in Cat., 4 should not be considered as a list of ‘categories’. He gives 
basically two main reasons to draw this rather striking conclusion : (I) in this treatise, 
there are several philological issues about title and textual unity which would not 
license certainty about its actual content37 ; (II) more specifically the treatise does 
not say anything clear from whom we can infer that it examines categories, nor 
uses the word kathgoriva unless twice (8.10b19, 21) and in insignificant contexts38. 
The latter reason, in my opinion, is questionable. First of all it is false that kathgoriva 
is used just twice in the Categories. There are four occurrences : 5, 3a35 ; 5, 3a37 ; 8, 
10b19 ; 8, 10b21. Now, in the former two the term is used in a non-technical fashion 
and has very likely the meaning ‘predicate’. Secondly, I do not see any good reason 
to consider the use of kathgoriva in Cat., 8, 10b19, 21 as aspecific or not pertinent. 
This assumption is unwarranted and the scholars endorsing it do not offer any clear 
reason to hold it39. In this passage Aristotle uses the word kathgoriva (10b19 : ta;~ 
a[lla~ kathgoriva~ ; b21 : tẁn a[llwn kathgoriẁn) with regard to items like posovn, poiovn, 
prov~ ti, pouv which unambiguously are the items signified by the ‘things said without 
any combination’ given in Categories, 4 — and the phrase ti tẁn toiouvtwn (10b23) 
clearly alludes to the full list. And, as is known, the items signified by the ‘things said 
without any combination’ are the subject of the survey carried out at least in Cat., 
4-9. Therefore, we actually do have textual evidence to claim that at least the section 
called Praedicamenta, viz. Cat., 4-9, of the Categories, whatever their real title might 
be, are about ‘categories’, whatever sense this word might have in this context40. And 
it does not seem too challenging to find an explanation for the two different uses in 
chapters five and eight : kathgoriva might well mean both items placed in a column 
of predicates, and at once the headings of these columns.
Moreover, although Frede holds that the Categories do not provide any answer 
to the question about the nature of categories41, at the same time, a few pages 
after this statement, he accepts that one of the uses of the term kathgoriva, as well 
as ‘kind of predication’ and ‘kind of predicate’, is « the ultimate genera of what 
37 Cf. M. frede, The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories, in Id., Essays 
cit., pp. 11-28 : pp. 24-28 ; Bodéüs, Aristote. [Categories], pp. xc-cx ; but see also the fresh attempt to 
reorganize the traditional textual architecture of the treatise in C. natalI, Struttura e organizzazione 
del trattato aristotelico detto Categorie, in BonellI, MasI eds., Studi sulle Categorie di Aristotele cit., 
pp. 17-30 : pp. 27-28. 
38 Cf. frede, The Title, Unity, and Authenticity, cit., p. 16 ; frede, Categories cit., pp. 30-31.
39 Cf. frede, Categories cit., p. 31 ; Barnes, Aristotle’s Categories cit., p. 196.
40 This allows to reply also to (I). 
41 Cf. frede, Categories cit., pp. 30-31.
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there is as they are distinguished, e.g., in the treatise Categories »42. Hence, even 
for Frede, there seems to be a meaning of kathgoriva conveyed by the Categories, 
and Frede believed it is that of gevnh tou` o[nto~, i.e. kinds of being (non-linguistic 
terms), albeit this, as a matter of fact, is far from obvious. It might well be the 
case that the old formula proposed by the Aristotelian commentators in Late 
Antiquity, of categories as « simple significant vocalizations, insofar as they signify 
things » (peri; fwnw`n shmantikw`n aJplw`n kaqo; shmantikaiv eijsi tw`n pragmavtwn) still has 
some explanatory efficacy, and some notable interpreters still accept that43. I 
must acknowledge, however, that with the last remarks I have not yet replied to 
all the objections formulated by Frede, but I hope they at least have some value 
in suggesting a revision of some relevant aspects of his interpretation.
I have argued that in I, 9 Aristotle deals with three lists : the four predicables 
(predications), the T-categories (predications), and the C-categories (predicates). 
I shall now provide an overall account of their connection, which is expressed 
through two verbs : ‘signifying’ (shmaivnein) and ‘saying’ (levgein). Let us first explain 
the meaning of these verbs and then how they work in connecting the three lists. 
The verb ‘saying’ (levgein), in three of its four occurrences follows the phrase 
‘what it is’. Aristotle shows the meaning of ‘saying what it is’ (tiv ejsti levgein) 
through three examples, then expresses it with an abstract formula at b36-37. 
The three examples are equivalent, so I shall recall just one of them : taking a 
man as example, a person saying (o{tan ... fh`/) (through a proposition) that this is 
a man or an animal, actually says what it is (b30-31). Outside the example, and 
according to the abstract formula : a person says what a certain item is, when, 
in the proposition she states, (a) the same thing is said of itself (aujto; peri; auJtou` 
levghtai) or (b) its genus is said of it (to; gevno~ peri; touvtou)44. What kinds of predication 
are (a) and (b) ? (a) is a definition. Strictly speaking, it is a self-predication. As 
Alexander already noticed, and modern scholars confirm, a self-predication might 
be considered as a particular type of definition45. (b) is undoubtedly a predication 
of genus. Hence (a) and (b) refer to predications according to two of the four 
42 Ibid., p. 35.
43 Cf. porph., In Cat., p. 58, 4-7 Bodeüs ; sIMpl., In Cat. , p. 11, 23-29 Kalbfleisch ; Menn, Metaphysics, 
Dialectic and the Categories cit., p. 321.
44 Cf. 103b36-7 : « for <with regard to> each of such things, both if it is said of itself and if the 
genus is said of this, it signifies what it is (e{kaston ga;r tw`n toiouvtwn, ejavn te aujto; peri; auJtou` levghtai 
ejavn te to; gevno~ peri; touvtou, tiv ejsti shmaivnei) ». I understand aujtov at b36 as not referring to e{kaston tw`n 
toiouvtwn. Further, as the examples show, the term aujtov  might refer either to a substantial or to a non-
substantial term (a[nqrwpo~ ; leukovn ; phcuai`on) : when there occurs an essential predication, in any of 
the C-categories, a tiv ejsti-predication will be formed, i.e. a predication according to the first T-category.
45 Cf. alex. aphr., In Top., p. 67, 8-11 ; MalInk, Categories cit., p. 280 and Id., Aristotle’s Modal 
Syllogistic cit., pp. 139-140.
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predicables and ‘saying what it is’ means making a predication according to the 
definition or the genus. On the other hand, a person does not say what a certain 
item is, when, in the proposition she states, the same thing is said of another (peri; 
eJtevrou levgein)46. In this case (non-essential predication), we shall have a predication 
according to one of the non-tiv ejsti T-categories. But such a predication can be 
made only when a proposition is formed out of an accident (sumbebhkov~) or a 
property (i[dion), which are the only two predicables not signifying an essential 
feature of a given subject.
The verb shmaivnein occurs eight times in I, 9 always tied to items belonging to 
one of the two lists of categories47. Two questions might be asked about this verb : 
(a) What does ‘signifying’ mean ? I am persuaded by Malink’s opinion, according 
to which, when Aristotle uses this verb in relation to his theory of categories, it 
always refers to the belonging of an item to one of the categories48. So ‘signifying’ 
a ‘predication’ means uttering a proposition which conveys one of the predicative 
relationships listed at b22-23 ; ‘signifying a ‘predicate’ means uttering a proposition 
whose predicate (e.g. b32-33) belongs to one of the kinds of predicate listed at b28-
29. (b) Who/What signifies ? There are four different subjects linked to shmaivnein : 
(i) protavsei~ (b25) for the occurrence at b27 ; (ii) the masculine subject expressed 
by the substantive participle oJ shmaivnwn (b27) for the occurrences of b28 ; (iii) the 
implicit subject of the three occurrences of fh̀/, which is likely an indefinite masculine 
pronoun49 and is also the implicit subject of the three occurrences of shmaivnei at b31, 
33, 35 ; (iv) the indefinite pronoun e{kaston (followed by the demonstrative plural 
pronoun tẁn toiouvtwn) for the occurrences of b37 and b38. I consider the first subject 
and the first occurrence of shmaivnein as the governing one. Aristotle, as we have 
already seen, states that it is a provtasi~ — every provtasi~ formed out from the four 
predicables — that signifies, i.e. indicates or express, one of the ten categories. The 
predicative relationship conveyed by one of the ten kinds of predications is expressed 
by a proposition constituted through one of the predicables. This is how the two 
systems of predication cut across each other, and this seems to me the main claim of 
this chapter 9. In b28 the participle oJ shmaivnwn is presumably a person who signifies50. 
But very likely, a speaker signifies something through a proposition — otherwise it 
would not make any sense to state that a person belongs to one of the categories. 
46 The structure of the sentence at b37-39 is exactly the same as that of that at b35-37, which I have 
already quoted. Therefore two implicit words should be found in the first part of the sentence : o{tan de; 
[aujto;] peri; eJtevrou [levghtai].
47 103b27, twice in 28, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38.
48 Cf. MalInk, Categories cit., p. 227.
49 Cf. Brunschwig’s translation : « quand… on dit ».
50 Cf. kahn, Questions cit., p. 270 ; MalcolM, On the Generation and Corruption cit., p. 663 ; frede, 
Categories cit., p. 12 ; MalInk, Categories cit., p. 272.
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Thus, the actual subject of the signification throughout the passage, at least until 
103b35 is a proposition : provtasi~ is what actually shmaivnei ; a person shmaivnei only 
inasmuch as she utters a provtasi~ 51. This leads me to believe that the last subject of 
shmaivnei, e{kaston tẁn toiouvtwn, does not interrupt this trend52. I am not saying that the 
implicit noun which the pronoun refers to is provtasi~, that is grammatically incorrect, 
provtasi~ being a feminine noun. But it is plausible that the neutral pronoun e{kaston 
refers generically to the three cases examined53 and we would not need necessarily 
a feminine pronoun eJkavsth referring to kathgoriva. 
These last remarks suggest the following conclusion about the connection 
between predicables, T-categories and C-categories. 
(1) Essential predication
[Predicables-level] ‘Definition’ and ‘genus’ i.e. saying what a certain item is.
[T-categories-level] ‘What it is’, i.e. signifying what a certain item is.
[C-categories-level] Any of the C-categories, i.e. signifying ‘substance’, ‘quality’ 
and so on.
(2) Non-essential predication
[Predicables-level] ‘Accident’ and ‘property’, i.e. not. saying what a certain item is.
[T-categories-level] Any of the other nine T-categories besides the first. 
[C-categories-level] Any of the other nine C-categories besides the first54.
4. conclusIon
Let me sum up what seems to me the chief philosophical claim that emerges 
from this survey. In the context of the description of the four predicables, Aristotle 
decides to devote a chapter of Topics, I to the comparison between this system 
51 A similar ambiguous case is at Soph., 262a9-e3. F. adeMollo, Names, Verbs, and Sentences in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy, in M. caMeron, r. J. staInton eds., Linguistic content. New Essays on the 
History of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, p. 43 n. 29 maintains that 
in this case there is an intended equivalence between the claim that with names a speaker names things 
and the claim that names name things. One might make the same point about these lines of Topics, I, 9. 
I do not exclude that this might be the case, but I do not think that this would jeopardize my point. If a 
speaker is able to name things only ‘with names’ it means that it is because of names that she is able to 
name. Similarly, it is because of a proposition that a person is able to signify. 
52 Pace MalInk, Categories cit., p. 276. 
53 I do not think that e{kaston refers to the predicates of the previous examples, because a predicate, 
alone, cannot signify a ‘what it is’, that is a predication.
54 Accordingly, in the case of a non-essential predication T-categories and C-categories coincide : 
for instance, a predication according to quality can be made only if the predicate that we use belongs 
to the kind of predicate of quality. 
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of predication, and another (T-categories), of whom Aristotle offers a complete 
list comprising ten items. I attempted to offer a fresh account of the relationship 
between these two systems of predication. I have maintained that these systems cut 
across each other and all the predications might be classified under the headings 
of one system or another. Thus, their relationship might be defined semantic 
(and biunivocal). Every proposition formed out of the four predicables signifies, 
i.e. expresses, at once the predicative relationship conveyed through one of the 
categories. The converse is likewise true. By means of an oJrismov~ or a gevno~, one 
(through a proposition) signifies the first kind of predication, the ‘what it is’. By 
means of a sumbebhkov~ or an i[dion, one signifies (through a proposition) one of 
the other T-categories.
Furthermore, Aristotle clarifies the connection between these two systems of 
predication and the list of predicates implied at Cat., 4 and recalled in Top., I, 9. 
When one makes a predication according to the ‘definition’ or the ‘genus’, she 
signifies the first T-categories and, in turn, any of the C-categories. Whereas, when 
one makes a predication according to the ‘accident’ or the ‘property’, she signifies 
any of the other nine T-categories besides the first and, in turn, any of the other 
nine C-categories besides the first.
What is the ultimate point of the introduction of these lists ? Categories (of 
both lists) are basically a classificatory and heuristic device. During his twenty-
year-research and discussions on predication in Plato’s Academy, Aristotle found 
out this extremely powerful dialectical tool, that he used to dissipate conceptual 
ambiguities and discover or bring out logical linguistic fallacies. It is a centrifuge 
carefully separating different elements which ordinary communicative praxis or 
sophistical tricks coagulate in equivocal single phrases. As a matter of historical 
fact, this might be considered as the most notable outcome of an Academic widely 
shared interest for linguistic ambiguities. In this sense its main philosophical 
role is to reveal and neatly articulate multivocity according to a certain pattern. 
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ABSTRACT
Systems of Predication. Aristotle’s Categories in Topics, I, 9
In this paper I investigate Aristotle’s account of predication in Topics, I, 9. I argue for 
the following interpretation. In this chapter Aristotle (I) presents two systems of predication 
cutting across each other, the system of the so-called four ‘predicables’ and of the ten 
‘categories’, in order to distinguish them and explore their mutual relationship. I propose 
a semantic interpretation of the relationship between them. According to this reading, 
every proposition formed through a predicable constitutes at the same time a predication 
according to one of the ten categories, and, consequently, signifies one of them, expressing 
one of the predicative relationship conveyed by them. Further, Aristotle (II) explains the 
predicative connection between these two systems and the ten items signified by the 
‘things said without any combination’ enumerated in Chapter 4 of the Categories, whose 
list is almost identical with that of categories in Top., I, 9, with the only exception of their 
first members. 
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